Dubious Progress in Iraq

November 15, 2007

Nicholas Berry

Yes, U.S. military and Iraqi civilian casualties are down, although 2007 has already been the most deadly year for U.S. troops. The current downturn in violence has varied causes: Recent U.S. reinforcements (called “the surge” to take away the taint of previous failure) provided more police on the ground in contentious neighborhoods; ethnic cleansing has created more secure single-sect Shiite and Sunni areas; and Sunni militias are now on the U.S. payroll.

However, reports from U.S. military and civilian officials in Iraq lament the fact that the Shiite-led government in Baghdad has not taken advantage of the lull to organize a truly national government. A window of opportunity has opened for the Shiite-led government to reconcile with their former foes, said Army Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno, commander of military operations in Iraq, but “it is unclear how long the window is going to be open.” The deputy commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, Brig. Gen. John Campbell, complained that Iraqi officials are not doing their jobs. “The ministers, they don’t get out. They don’t know what the hell is going on on the ground.” Other military officials are angry at the Iraqis for their inaction, warning that today’s somewhat quiescent Sunnis have limited patience. Prof. Mark Lynch at George Washington University believes that because of U.S. policy Iraq is moving “towards a warlord state, along a Basra model, with power devolved to local militias, gangs, tribes, and power-brokers, with a purely nominal central state.”

But this political failure should surprise no one.

The U.S. has orchestrated a power struggle in Iraq.

The Shiites want to rule.

The Sunnis want to prevent the Shiites from ruling.

The Kurds don’t care who rules in Baghdad as long as they are left alone to rule in Northern Iraq.

The logic of the so-called American progress in the war relies on the presence of 170,000 U.S. troops for protecting the Shiite-led government and neighborhoods, for protecting the Sunni tribes now on the payroll, for policing clashes between the two groups, and for giving the Kurds in the north security guarantees. In effect, the surge strategy has moved Iraq further away from national reconciliation and national government. More U.S.-sourced security to each hunkered-down sector has inhibited reconciliation and cemented the occupation.

As strange it might seem, less U.S.-sourced security would jump-start reconciliation and the building of a national government. There would be conflict, of course, but without it there would be no costs to be ended by a settlement among the Iraqis.

Over the next several months, U.S. troop levels are scheduled to come down rapidly. They should continue to drop. A tentative target date for withdrawal of American combat (not training) forces should be announced. Iraqis must be made aware that they must put a government together or face a dramatic resurgence in violence. Perhaps a taste of renewed violence will provide the motivation.

It has to be time to deal or die.

Nicholas Berry is Director of Foreign Policy Forum