Attacking Iraq Invites Retributive Violence

November 07, 2002

Col. Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.)

Experts have pointed out that "new terrorists" such as those in al Qaeda
have very different goals from earlier groups that have used violence to
advance their agenda.

The latter usually espoused a political program of some kind as the reason
for their specific actions, for which they willingly claimed responsibility.
They saw themselves as catalysts if not active participants in the new order
ushered in by their "revolution." There are still a number of such
organizations around the globe with specific agendas calling for political,
economic, or social reform.

"New terrorists" such as Osama bin Laden refrain from tying specific acts to
direct demands for change. Theirs is a more sweeping agenda, one that aims
at redressing the balance between good and evil, grace and depravity. They
see their revolution as existing on a higher, more spiritual plain. They are
the "appointed" earthly agents of a divine power whose mission is to exact
retribution (as opposed to a secular "retaliation") against sinners. Having
no self-oriented agenda, they have neither need to claim credit for their acts
nor compulsion to live to see the effects of their violence.

The "original sin" driving al Qaeda is the continuing presence of foreign
troops - mostly U.S. - in Saudi Arabia, the home of the two most holy sites
of Islam. Moreover, since these forces are not there through conquest but by
permission of the Saudi government, that government is complicit in the sin
and must also be punished. The most direct way to rid Saudi Arabia of
foreigners is to replace the government. A more indirect way is to make the
cost of remaining in Islamic lands too high for the foreigners by inflicting
retribution for their continuing offensive presence. Naturally, the
foreigners can be expected to fight back until that unknown cost threshold
(lives and treasure) is breached.

If this analysis is correct, three conclusions follow.

Not every "terrorist" act can be ascribed to al Qaeda or its operatives.
While military action succeeded in destroying the safe haven provided to al
Qaeda by the former rulers of Afghanistan, the continuing use of armed
forces in Afghanistan is producing diminishing returns and increasing
casualties among non-combatants.

Even should the United States succeed in eliminating the leadership
structure of al Qaeda, the permanent presence of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia
will be a continuing cause for retributive acts by those who subscribe to
the views of al Qaeda. It is thus important for the overall anti-terror
strategy to identify those with a political/economic/social "cause" (e.g., a
religiously-based government, political independence, or cultural autonomy)
from those with a retributive agenda, as the former might be more readily
dissuaded from acting than the latter.

While the al Qaeda leadership may not directly order or plan specific acts
of violence, they will claim that successful strikes against their enemies
are "in-kind" retribution. For example, in August 1998 the United States
fired cruise missiles at al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and at a
pharmaceutical plant in Sudan in retaliation for the bombing of the U.S.
embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. The attacks of Sept. 11 last year might be
interpreted as al Qaeda's version of retribution by "cruise missiles."

Given these conclusions, what should be done?

With al Qaeda's leadership forced out of Afghanistan, the United States and
its allies must move rapidly to assist the new Afghan government in
establishing security in the country and building for the future. These are
different requirements from fighting the Taliban. The mandate of the U.N.
authorized International Security Assistance Force, nominally a peace
enforcement operation, has muted into a law-and-order policing effort
supported by the interim Afghan administration. It can do little more, given
its restrictions: confined to Kabul and capped at 5,000 troops, less than
half of the total foreign troop presence in the country. That balance needs
to be redressed by adding more peacekeeping forces to help protect
humanitarian operations and provide basic security until Afghan police
forces are trained. In the same vein, donor nations that pledged in January
to help rebuild the country must redeem their promises. Only one-third of
the foreign aid pledged for 2002 has been delivered.

In the short run, the United States ought to re-examine the need to station
forces in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region. U.S. air forces are in Saudi
Arabia primarily to support combat aircraft that enforce the "no-fly zone"
over southern Iraq declared by the United States in response to Iraqi
military attacks against Shi'ites. It should be possible, in conjunction
with the steps below, to gradually withdraw these forces as Iraq is brought
back into the community of nations in good standing. In the medium-term, the
United States and other developed countries have to act with developing
nations to eradicate the political, economic and social conditions that
provide fertile soil for religious and non-religious extremism and violence.
And in the long-term, the United States (and other developed countries)
needs to lessen its dependence on petroleum-based energy sources, which is
the primary rationale for the U.S. interest in the Persian Gulf.

Just as Sept. 11 was seen by al Qaeda's leaders as retribution for 1998,
there remains a still-to-be enacted retribution for the Taliban's defeat.
Any future military assault by the United States, including the threatened
attack on Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power, simply invites further
counteraction by followers of al Qaeda's philosophy. This probability
suggests that every means short of armed conflict needs to be thoroughly and
exhaustively explored and careful choices made about which are appropriate
to apply.

Will these alternatives succeed? Unless they are seriously tried, the world
will never know. But the world has seen what wars and extremist violence
produce - incalculable costs in human life, in national treasure, and in
lost opportunities.

Daniel Smith, a West Point Graduate and Vietnam veteran, is Senior Fellow on
Military Affairs at the Friends Committee on National Legislation. This article first appeared on FCNL’s Web site, www.fcnl.org.