The Elusive Iraq End Game

July 31, 2008

Nicholas Berry

General David Petraeus could not or would not answer when asked by NPR on July 28, what the end game for victory in Iraq would be. He rambled on about the surge lowering violence, from an average of 55 attacks per day to far fewer.

The surge, however, was designed to spur sectarian and ethnic political reconciliation and deals on oil, Kirkuk, and provincial elections. So far it has failed on all these accounts.

But the issue of how to end the Iraq war has proven most elusive, at least in public statements by the Bush administration.

Actually, both the White House and the Pentagon know how to win the war, but the Bush administration doesn’t want to say it and the Pentagon is ordered not to say it.

Troop withdrawals are the essential element in victory. But since Sen. Obama makes this case, it has to remain unspoken. Obama must not be given credit for being right again on the war. After all, he is tagged with being inexperienced in foreign policy.

Instead, the White House talks about victory without meaning or definition. Withdrawal, it says, “depends on conditions on the ground.” And conditions on the ground are getting better. Progress is being made. According to the Bush administration and Sen. McCain, the surge, which Obama opposed and still opposes, is the sole reason the war is being won. McCain accuses Obama of wanting victory in the election more than victory in Iraq. A withdrawal timetable, regardless of what Obama or Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki say, will deliver Iraq to al-Qaeda in Iraq.

With the White House, the McCain campaign, talk radio, and TV pundits on message, this propaganda has traction. The American people have proven themselves to be enormously gullible to national militarist propaganda, in spite of the fact that a solid majority favor a phased withdrawal from Iraq. Somehow, someway, someday in the future, progress in Iraq will lead to that.

But, the warlords don’t want to talk about how or when. The endgame will only appear in the misty future, not to be publicly discussed even if privately planned. The “time horizon” – the euphemism for a timetable – will depend on conditions on the ground, although what exactly these conditions will be are left unspecified.

Gen. Petraeus knows that victory requires ending the occupation, but as he acknowledges in interviews, he is ordered not to deal with “political directives” on the war. He recognizes that the occupation itself is the principal cause of the insurgency and violence. He is aware that announcing a withdrawal timetable will affect conditions on the ground, spurring Iraqi political factions to form coalitions, energizing the Iraqi government to actually govern, further marginalizing al-Qaeda in Iraq (whose only reason for being is fighting Americans), and greatly reducing attacks on U.S. forces.

However, Gen. Petraeus’ meteoric rise didn’t happen by bucking the White House.

It is clear that if it weren’t for the presidential campaign and Bush’s myopic defense of his legacy, a withdrawal timetable would be in order. Conditions on the ground are favorable and a withdrawal timetable would make them even more favorable.

There has been progress on an endgame, very little of which can be attributed to the surge.

Al-Qaeda in Iraq has fumbled badly, attacking Sunni insurgent forces that have cooperated with the Iraqi government or that have not taken orders to fight Americans. It has assassinated Sunni tribal leaders in contact with U.S. forces. Iraqis do not like foreigners on their land, as their history and this war so amply prove. Al-Qaeda terrorists are not Iraqis and are far too arrogant and far too blood-thirsty.

As a counter to al-Qaeda, Sunni tribal leaders became receptive to the formation of Awakening Councils, in effect going on the American payroll. In many areas, especially in Anbar Province, the insurgency was put on hold. Violence subsided.

In the Shia areas, Moqtada al-Sadr became convinced that U.S. forces will leave in the near future and ordered his Madhi Army to stand down, regroup, and rearm. For al-Sadr, American withdrawal will be necessary if McCain is elected or will be by design if Obama, as is more likely, enters the White House. This requires political organizing, not combat, in anticipation of a return to Iraqi sovereignty.

The current Iraqi government of Nouri al-Maliki also anticipates the withdrawal of U.S. forces and has indicated it favors a timeline for just that. To prove its nationalist credentials and its competence to govern, it has conducted successful security operations in Basra and elsewhere. Its security forces now control a majority of the country’s eighteen provinces.

Conditions are right for a phased withdrawal and victory. Political considerations, however, will likely push this key strategic move until after November 4.

Nicholas Berry is Director of Foreign Policy Forum and, to disclose, is Chairman of the Annapolis Democratic Central Committee. FPF, however, will continue to strive to be non-partisan.